Transformation of Political Values in the EU: Pros and Cons. The Papers of the “Round-table” Debate of the Lecturers and Students of Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia
Pro-EU positions were deemed risky and mainstream parties on the left and the right shied away from articulating a clear and forceful defence of the EU integration. This became more symptomatic in the UK where Eurosceptic positions became the norm and pro-EU брексит новости politicians were self-censoring, being marginalised or ridiculed, especially by the dominant right-wing press. Brexit is primarily an opportunity to reconfigure European sovereignty around shared citizen interests, not solely EU Corporate interests.
reports and literature available at his disposal. Nevertheless, this work succeeds in carrying through a coherent message that combines interesting facts and conclusions, which could serve as a starting point for further research of integration processes in EU as well as political processes in Britain which resulted in the vote for Brexit. There is one more reason, however, why Brexit would be a disaster for Europe. The Chinese government is playing for time in Hong Kong in the hope that the demonstrators will lose heart and perhaps the will to resist.
The success on elections in European Parliament of populist Party of Independence of the United Kingdom was connected in the book with the general negative perception of EU and the requirement to restrict immigration from other EU countries. The author accuses T. Blair’s government of the scale of potential labour migration and chose not to impose transitional controls after the 2004 enlargement21. He mentions that even the Europhile wing in the Conservative Party recognized that enormous gains that the free movement of EU citizens offers, such as capital mobility and free labour movement, provides UK businesses with a vast pool of resources with which to innovate and grow, can be realized but only on the basis of accepting constrains on immigration policy. As it becomes known from the book, the Eurosceptics demanded unilateral concessions for the UK, such as parliamentary veto on European legislative procedure, as well as concessions on fundamental principles of EU, in particular, concerning free movement of EU citizens22.
Glencross examines similarities and differences between the 2016 and the 1975 referendums. He argues that the British position towards integration — something greater than the mainstream political trend (possibly, he means eurosceptics), was “not just nationalist populist as with the Front National in France”, it was a position in which “the possibility of withdrawal from the EU” was “openly discussed and real readiness was expressed «to actually devolve this decision to the public vote”16. A. Glenkross highlights concept of “British exceptionalism” and confirms his argument by the UK refusal from euro, the Schengen agreement as well as by the determination to leave from the European ideal “of ever closer union”12.
In 2017 the government stated its position in two White Papers and reports on the preliminary results of negotiations by the government members. British and would enable Eurosceptics to claim that EU was unreformed and was moving to a federative superstate. Secondly, severe criticism from mass media which not only drowned the statements of Europhiles, but also heated the anti-European moods due to manipulation by the facts.
But it seems internal politics is blocking agreement on national policy, resulting in the default path of a “hard brexit” or crash-out. I don’t claim to understand the politics behind that result. Unfortunately, this was the reflection of an evolution of political discourses during the last https://www.maximarkets.org/ 20 years when mainstream political forces stopped defending the European project. After the end of the Cold War there was less urgency in supporting solidarity and cohesion in the West, which enabled nationalists to go unchallenged and set the agenda for the discussions about the EU.
The other “more forgivable error of judgment concerned underestimating the opportunism of certain Conservative cabinet ministers” due to the fact that 6 ministers of the government voted to leave EU. Nevertheless, as follows https://www.maximarkets.org/brexit/ from the analysis of results featured in the book, D. Cameron managed to get some concessions and changes in all the issues which were put under negotiation. Therefore, Britain could confirm its special status in the EU.
According to the author, most challenging of all is what to do about participation in the single market — the location for half of UK trade and a magnet for foreign investment. Complete withdrawal from this market is self-destructive.
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- Therefore, Britain could confirm its special status in the EU.
- On the whole, despite the fact that some of the author’s observations have become obsolete in the result of the pace of developments since the book’s publication, the research by A.
- Cameron’s government strategy and reflection on the “political philosophy of Brexit”.
- Its author, the British researcher, the senior lecturer of the chair of politics and international relations of Aston University, A. Glenkross prepared substantial, but not deprived of flaws the research within short limits of time.
- London has as much to offer continental interests (a conduit for independence from regulation) as the EU has to offer the UK in return.
The UK government went into the renegotiation harbouring a legitimate concern that the Eurozone may act as a block within the EU, using its majority in the EU Council to pass laws, primarily for its own interests. As a result, financial regulations could be imposed on the City making it less globally competitive, thereby hurting a key UK economic interest. Lastly, there were the demands brexit википедия surrounding individual rights. This is because the right of EU citizens to move to the UK became inherently politicized as part of a broader debate over immigration — a subject absent from the 1975 EEC referendum. The author reported that the Great Britain denied access to in-work benefits to recently arrived jobseekers from elsewhere in the EU, despite it was discriminatory.
Thirdly, the presence of the organized and well-funded political opposition in the form of the Party of independence of the United Kingdom so that there was a merge of nationalist Euroscepticism with anti-elites mood. The author of the book successfully emphasizes the fact of ever-present debate in Europe concerning the spectre of a federal superstate. According to Glencross, the claims of Eurosceptics were reduced to the arguments that EUs institutional structure and its policy effects had evolved beyond the control of British voters since 1975. Therefore, Europhiles across the major political parties believed that the only way to settle this argument was by resorting to the voice of people20.
One of the benefits of work is that the author, among big number of referendums which took place in other brexit новости EU countries on the European policy (about 50), managed to reveal the novelty of the British approach. A.
A. Glenkross assumes that D. Cameron was confident of winning the referendum on the basis of a pragmatism and bean-counting evaluation. However, the public opinion “was out of step with the government cost — benefit argument” and “David Cameron’s gamble proved a great miscalculation”4. The author ranks the 2016 referendum amongst the major political blunders of British Prime Ministers which caused shock waves across Europe and North Atlantic. The decision to delegate responsibility to the people ended up costing him his position as Prime Minister.
As follows from the book, one of the main issues — migration from the EU countries, which displeased Eurosceptics, has been partially settled. As a consequence, the Great Britain would have become less attractive to emigration (due to reduction of social benefits and grants for “recent immigrants”).
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Maastricht-Nice-Lisbon were never the promising path. The contracts, substitute for a constitution, have created an unmanageable and largely self-serving monster, the EU-institutions in Brussels, Luxemburg and Strassburg. They have created a bureaucratic Institutional Dictatorship brexit and have effectively eliminated the ability to elect or vote down any of the institutions headed by a series of appointed ‘presidents’. They have effectively eliminated any democratic legitimacy and made a mockery our of parliamentary representation and accountability.
Glenkross agrees with the false opinion of the historian R. Granieri5, which regards the choice made by British voters as anti-EU, because “at no time has Britain actively sought to undermine an organization within which it was already a member”6. Moreover, he recognizes unexpectedness of the result for the academics because “there are no navigational charts for the course that now needs to be plotted”.